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Globalization is a hallmark of the twenty-fi rst-century 
world. As transportation and telecommunications grow 
in both effi ciency and level of performance and as the 
ambit of the Internet expands, it becomes easier and eas-
ier for nations to both connect and coordinate with one 
another over long distances. And the declining relevance 
of boundaries in the post–Cold War world makes it more 
and more feasible politically for them to actually do so.
Korea, the United States, and Central Asia are, of course, 
located in distant parts of the world, with thousands of 
miles separating each of the partners to this disparate tri-
angle. Yet all three corners of the triangle have signifi -
cant and growing economic and geopolitical relevance 
for one another. All are deeply concerned with problems 
of global energy—Central Asia as a producer, Korea as 
a consumer, and the United States in a variety of roles: 
producer, consumer, and service provider. The three 
members of this strategic global triangle are all likewise 
deeply concerned with the future of Russia—that it be 
a constructive force in world affairs but that it also be 
constrained from returning to the expansionist, at times 
imperialist, policies that the Soviet Union once pursued. 
They all likewise share a deep concern that China’s fu-
ture be constructive and stable.
There are, of course, important differences of national 
orientation and approach—not only across the triangle, 
but also within Central Asia itself. Some are more mar-
ket oriented, for example, while others are less so. Yet 
these three broad common concerns—energy, China, and 
the future of the post-Soviet space—are broadly shared. 
They provide important reference points for thinking 
about the prospects of the strategic U.S.-Korea-Central 
Asian triangle itself.
Special Korean Concerns
Energy is a special concern for Korea, in particular because 
it has one of the most serious problems of energy insecurity 
in the world.1 Korea’s pronounced energy dilemma has three 
dimensions:
Lack of domestic energy sources.•  Approximately 
84 percent of Korea’s total energy supply is import-
ed, compared with 82 percent in Japan, 60 percent in 
Germany, and only 27 percent in the United States.2
Heavy dependence on oil.•  Korea is roughly 50 per-
cent dependent on oil, compared with 47 percent in 
Japan, which is the most heavily oil-dependent na-
tion in the Group of Seven, and compared with a 
global average of 38 percent.3
Heavy dependence on the Middle East.•  Korea gets 
around 75 percent of its oil from the Middle East, 
compared with around 45 percent for China, 26 per-
cent for France, and only 21 percent for the United 
States. Japan, with 88 percent dependence, is the 
only major nation with higher reliance on the Mid-
dle East than Korea for oil. Apart from this heavy 
oil dependence, Korea also depends on the Middle 
East for 55 percent of its natural gas, which is also 
extremely high in comparative perspective.
Precisely because Korea’s dependence on the Middle East is so 
high, and that region’s political future is so uncertain, the ROK 
sees considerable economic and strategic value in diversifying 
its sources of supply. Australia together with Southeast Asian 
nations like Indonesia and Cambodia have some potential as 
sources of future supply, especially with respect to natural gas. 
So does Africa, in both oil and gas. The most promising oppor-
tunities for diversifi cation away from the Middle East, however, 
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lie in what the administration of President Lee Myung-
bak has recently called the “energy Silk Road”—a belt 
of promising energy producers stretching from Russia, 
across Central Asia, and on into the Middle East itself.4
Russia and Central Asia—the constituent elements of the 
former Soviet Union—also have a broader signifi cance 
for Korea that transcends energy. The structure of their 
raw-material-based economies, at the middle level of 
economic development, is highly complementary to that 
of Korea, making them promising markets for cost-ef-
fective Korean manufactures ranging from automobiles 
and consumer electronics to heavy capital equipment. 
Korea’s industrial-group structure, centering on general 
trading companies that can operate on low margins and 
profi t in multiple ways by generating trade fl ows, makes 
the ROK especially well adapted to trading and resource 
development in economies just beginning to make a tran-
sition to the market.
Korea also has political and strategic stakes in deepened 
relations with Russia and Central Asia. Indeed, collec-
tively, the new nations of the former Soviet Union could 
well hold the key to the prospects and timing of Korean 
reunifi cation. Russia, after all, is one of the few major 
powers with a relatively clear stake in a unifi ed or at least 
confederalized Korea, given the diverse trade centering 
on resource and electric energy that could fl ow for Russia 
from relaxation of North-South tensions on the Korean 
peninsula. Intra-Korean détente could also enhance pros-
pects for an “iron Silk Road” of transit trade between 
Korea and Europe, via Russia. The Central Asian states 
could also play a more signifi cant intermediary role in 
inter-Korean relations than often realized.
These areas, after all, have large numbers of ethnic Ko-
rean residents—a total of approximately 700,000 in the 
former Soviet Union as a whole. Many have deep fam-
ily ties to North Korea, as the bulk of the former Soviet 
Koreans (known as koryo saram) have ancestral home-
lands in the northern part of the peninsula. Partly for this 
reason, the DPRK (North Korea) continues to maintain 
diplomatic relations with Uzbekistan, making it among 
the few countries on earth whose diplomatic ties include 
both of the Koreas. The former Soviet Union is thus, for 
both Seoul and Pyongyang, an important arena for both 
intelligence gathering and possible reconciliation, in ad-
dition to its economic attractions.
Apart from the personal dimension, the former Soviet 
Union is also important to Seoul, politically and strategi-
cally, for the potential leverage it provides with North 
Korea itself. Pyongyang, after all, lacks both foreign 
exchange and energy resources. It is heavily dependent 
on China for markets, manufactures, and even oil, and it 
fears the consequences of that dependence. Like Seoul 
in other respects, Pyongyang wants to diversify its ties 
beyond Beijing, and both the United States and South 
Korea, in different ways, aid it in that task.
Central Asia and American Interests
The United States, like Korea, does have some important 
economic stakes in Central Asia, albeit interests more 
concentrated in the oil exploration, development, and pro-
duction sectors.5 U.S. fi rms have major stakes, fi rst of all, 
in all of the three major producing fi elds of the region—
Tengiz and Karachaganak in Kazakhstan and the Azeri-
Chirag-Guneshli (ACG) offshore fi eld in Azerbaijan.6 
Chevron is the largest private oil producer in Kazakh-
stan, with major stakes in the country’s two largest-pro-
ducing oil projects—Tengiz and Karachaganak.7 Exxon-
Mobil is also a major partner in the Kashagan fi eld—the 
largest new oil fi nd in the world since Prudhoe Bay in 
1968—which should be coming onstream between 2011 
and 2013.8 U.S. companies are also important partners in 
the strategic Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline and its 
Supsa natural-gas cohort, which together allow the ex-
port of Azeri and potentially trans-Caspian oil and gas to 
Western markets without transiting Russia, as Figure 7, 
presented later in the manuscript, makes clear.
Apart from economic interests in the energy sector, the 
United States also has important strategic concerns in 
Central Asia, which, after all, lies directly adjacent to 
Russia, China, India, and the Middle East. U.S. bases 
in Kyrgyzstan and, until 2006, in Uzbekistan have been 
important in the struggle against Islamic terrorism in 
Afghanistan. Given their distinctive central location in 
the heart of Eurasia, they could be important as staging 
or transit areas for operations across half the globe, and 
particularly should the struggle against terrorism in Af-
ghanistan intensify. American engagement with Central 
Asia—like Korea’s engagement—likewise helps sustain 
the precarious autonomy of the Central Asian nations in 
the face of Russian and Chinese pressures, preventing 
the nations in the Commonwealth of Independent States 
or the Shanghai Cooperation Organization from attaining 
a perverse regional cohesion that might threaten West-
ern geostrategic interests throughout the region and the 
world.
Why the U.S. and Korean Roles are Potentially 
Synergistic
Both Korea and the United States have a common in-
terest in Central Asian self-determination and can rein-
force the region’s autonomy of surrounding great powers 
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through their involvement in the region. The two coun-
tries have clearly parallel interests but highly comple-
mentary roles—a synergy that could intensify in coming 
years, as we shall see. The United States, of course, has 
immense political-military power-projection capabili-
ties, which provide tacit leverage. Yet the United States 
is geographically far from the region and has few cultural 
or economic ties apart from energy investments. Korea, 
conversely, lacks America’s hard power yet arguably 
wields substantial soft power owing to cultural ties, the 
attractiveness of the Korean economic model, and Ko-
rea’s role as a cost-effective supplier of both consumer 
and capital goods.
Korea, whose bilateral relations with Russia are relative-
ly good, is also better placed to operate in Russia’s Near 
Abroad than Moscow’s longtime Cold War antagonist, 
the United States. Yet both Korea and the United States 
have a common interest in Central Asia’s autonomy, 
prosperity, and stability, so should fi nd it possible to tac-
itly cooperate in pursuit of this common goal. This sort 
of third-country collaboration has the added benefi t of 
strengthening the U.S.-Korea bilateral alliance itself, by 
serving clear common interests.
Central Asia’s Strategic Location and 
Endowments
In advance of a detailed discussion of specifi c interests or 
relationships within the U.S.-Korea-Central Asia triangle, 
it is important to note Central Asia’s strategic location, 
deep geopolitical vulnerabilities, and unusual resources 
endowments, which give the region such global signifi -
cance. As shown in Figure 1, the region, comprising fi ve 
core and three additional loosely related former Soviet 
republics, lies between Russia, a once and possible future 
superpower with nearly one-third of the world’s proved 
natural-gas reserves, and the nations of the Persian Gulf, 
which hold nearly two-thirds of the world’s oil. Tbilisi, 
the capital of Georgia, at the heart of the Caucasus, is 
only 800 miles from Tehran and a mere 1,000 miles from 
the Persian Gulf. Tashkent, at the heart of Central Asia 
proper, is only 1,200 miles from the Gulf and 1,000 miles 
from the Russian frontier.
As is clear from Figure 2, there are fi ve major nations 
in Central Asia proper—Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyr-
gyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan. All are located 
east and north of the Caspian Sea, in the heart of Eurasia, 
but uniformly without access to any ocean. In addition, 
west of the Caspian lie Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Arme-
nia, technically known as the Caucasus but with linkages 
to trans-Caspian neighbors that are suffi ciently important 
in historical, political, and economic terms to merit in-
cluding them in a broader analysis such as that presented 
here.
Figure 1: Strategic Location of Central Asia
Figure 2: Overview of the Caucasus and 
Central Asia
Within Central Asia, Uzbekistan is by far the most heav-
ily populated, with 27 million people, and it holds par-
ticular geopolitical importance. It is the one major state 
in Central Asia that does not directly border Russia, as is 
clear from Figure 2. This fortunate geopolitical circum-
stance affords Tashkent special autonomy and potential 
leverage. Uzbekistan is also the transportation hub and 
cultural heart of the region, with the bulk of the ethnic 
Korean population, as well as a major natural-gas pro-
ducer. Its relations with Korea are particularly well de-
veloped, and it will be accorded particular attention in 
our analysis.
Kazakhstan, however, is the largest nation in Central Asia 
geographically, and by a signifi cant margin it is the larg-
est oil producer. Its massive Tengiz fi eld, at the northern 
end of the Caspian Sea, is potentially one of the richest 
energy-producing areas in the world to begin production 
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during the past 20 years. And the even larger Kashagan 
fi eld, located only 70 miles to the northwest, is the largest 
discovered anywhere on earth over the last 30 years al-
though it will probably not enter production until around 
2011–13. With its massive, as yet largely untouched oil 
reserves, Kazakhstan can easily continue expanding pro-
duction for at least 10 to 15 years into the future, as sug-
gested in Figure 3; it is one of the few nations on earth 
with this capacity. It also has, as Figure 3 also suggests, 
enormous future potential as a uranium supplier.
Figure 3: Prospective Oil and Natural Gas Produc-
tion in Kazakhstan
Source: Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources of the Repub-
lic of Kazakhstan
Kazakhstan will thus almost inevitably loom larger in the 
global energy future. And international energy fi rms, in-
cluding prominently such U.S. majors as Chevron (Ten-
giz fi eld), ExxonMobil (Kashagan fi eld), and Nukem 
(uranium), have been able to retain substantial equity 
stakes in its resources, in contrast with the situation in 
Russia and most parts of the developing world, where 
natural resources usually lie under state control, man-
aged by local public enterprises. This unusual scope for 
foreign private enterprise makes Kazakhstan important 
to the United States and Korea from a corporate as well 
as energy-security point of view. Several of the major 
projects now under way are presented in Figure 4.
Turkmenistan, although only sparsely populated and far 
from the center of the region, is highly consequential 
in the world of natural gas. It holds some of the most 
substantial proved gas reserves on earth, with much of 
the country remaining to be explored. As with respect 
to Kazakhstan’s oil, these huge reserves remain largely 
untapped, as the country was ruled until 2006 by an ec-
centric, Russia-oriented autocratic president, Saparmurat 
Niazov, whose eccentricities discouraged international 
transactions. Since 2007, however, following Niazov’s 
death in December 2006, Turkmenistan has become 
much more internationally oriented. It is now an object 
of keen attention from nations to the north, south, east, 
and west, as we shall see.
Figure 4: Major Energy Projects in the Caspian Sea 
Regions
All of the new Central Asian nations, of course, were part 
of the Soviet Union less than two decades ago. To rein-
force central control and national cohesion, for more than 
a half century the Soviets made a practice of construct-
ing critical infrastructure, including pipelines, railways, 
and even electric-power grids, in an internally oriented 
fashion, as shown in Figure 5, with few cross-border 
networks, especially across traditional Cold War fault 
lines. As a consequence, even to this day almost all of 
the major strategic access routes from Central Asia to the 
rest of the world run through Russia proper. Due to this 
embedded geoeconomic situation, Russia thus naturally 
becomes the region’s window on the world, providing 
Moscow with powerful political-economic infl uence and 
lucrative potential monopolistic rents.
Although sandwiched between the two regions with the 
most substantial energy-producing potential on earth—
Russia and the Persian Gulf—Central Asia has substantial 
energy resources in its own right. Most of the oil and gas 
is concentrated in the nations of Central Asia proper, east 
of the Caspian Sea, as indicated in Table 1. Kazakhstan, 
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Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan have especially substantial 
reserves, making trans-Caspian infrastructure issues stra-
tegically important, especially for Europe and the United 
States, as we shall see. Azerbaijan, however, on the west-
ern shore of the Caspian, is also an important supplier 
to the West, despite relatively modest overall resources, 
and will continue to be so for the next decade at least.
Figure 5: Central Asia’s Russia-Centric Transit Pipe-
line Structure
Table 1: Oil and Natural Gas Reserves in Central Asia 
and the Caspian Sea Region, 2006, in billions of bar-
rels (for oil) or trillion cubic feet (for gas)
Source: U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Admin-
istration, July 2006
Caspian resource endowments with respect to natural gas 
are broadly parallel to those for oil. The three nations 
best endowed with oil reserves are also among the best 
equipped with respect to natural gas, although Turkmeni-
stan, rather than Kazakhstan, has the largest reserves. Uz-
bekistan, with 66 trillion cubic feet of proved reserves, is 
the one important addition.
Caspian Sea natural-gas endowments are especially im-
pressive when seen in global comparative context. As 
indicated in Figure 6, the combined gas reserves of the 
major Central Asian states appear to be larger than those 
of Saudi Arabia and also those of the North Sea. Impor-
tantly, Central Asia also has potential to steadily expand 
capacity during the coming decade if formidable fi nan-
cial and geopolitical obstacles can be overcome.
Figure 6: Caspian Sea Natural Gas Reserves Com-
pared with Reserves of Other Countries, 2006
There are thus three important sets of energy issues re-
lating to Central Asia: (1) production and exploration in 
Central Asia itself, including conditions for multinational 
fi rms engaged in such activities, (2) transit issues for ex-
ports from landlocked Central Asia to the broader world, 
and (3) the region’s geopolitically strategic location in 
relation to the nations with the largest energy reserves on 
earth (those of Russia and the Persian Gulf). Both Cen-
tral Asia, on the one hand, and the U.S.-Korea alliance, 
on the other, have common interests with respect to these 
three questions, as we shall see. All of them desire the 
unimpeded fl ow of Central Asian energy to the rest of the 
world, at market-oriented prices, and want to see energy 
help to sustain the broader autonomy of the nations of the 
region in international affairs. Central Asia, Korea, and 
the United States would each prefer somewhat different 
outcomes, of course, but they do share important com-
mon interests, which should be noted. 
Apart from oil and natural gas, Central Asia also has sub-
stantial uranium reserves. Kazakhstan alone has 15 per-
cent of the global total and aspires to be the world’s largest 
producer by 2015, with 30 percent of the fuel fabrication 
market.9 Uzbekistan also has substantial reserves,10 and 
currently mines more uranium than the United States.11 
In a world of prospectively high, albeit volatile, global 
energy prices and the revival of nuclear power as a long-
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term energy supply option, these uranium reserves are 
also of growing importance. They will likely grow even 
more so after 2013, when secondary supply from dis-
mantled nuclear weapons, currently around 13 percent of 
total supply, is expected to be exhausted.12 The relative 
ease of transporting refi ned uranium products, even by 
air, adds to their attraction, especially for distant coun-
tries like Korea and the United States.
The Access Issue and Its Geoeconomic Implications
As can be inferred from the preceding discussion, access 
for Central Asia’s substantial resources to world markets 
is an important issue for the nations of the region and for 
the broader international community as well. It is impor-
tant in two interrelated respects—because the uniformly 
landlocked nations of Central Asia intrinsically need ac-
cess for their own resources, and because their indepen-
dent access to world markets undercuts the monopolistic 
political-economic power that Russia would otherwise 
exert through its control over transit routes from the re-
gion.
The heart of the transit issue is pipeline infrastructure 
for oil and gas. This is a highly capital-intensive under-
taking, intimately related to geopolitics and subject to a 
high degree of political risk owing to the huge amounts 
of money involved as well as the long lead times between 
project conception and fi nancing on the one hand and ac-
tual construction on the other. Typical pipeline projects 
in the region, such as the BTC pipeline from the Cas-
pian Sea to the Mediterranean, seen in Figure 7, cost up-
ward of $4 billion to build and take nearly a decade to 
construct. Due to the substantial time and cost involved, 
pipeline construction, while lucrative, involves sub-
stantial risk for any private fi rms involved, thus making 
consortia arrangements and home-country governmental 
support attractive.
Figure 7: Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline, Central 
Asia’s Independent Access Route to World Markets
Figures 1 and 2 show clearly the four broad potential ac-
cess routes for Central Asian oil and gas to world mar-
kets—to the north, south, east, and west. The northern 
route is through Russia and is already established. The 
western route runs from Azerbaijan through the vola-
tile Caucasus to Turkey—the BTC oil pipeline has been 
completed from Baku to Ceyhan on the Mediterranean, 
and a gas pipeline to Supsa on the Black Sea. Yet the stra-
tegically important trans-Caspian issue—access for mas-
sive Kazakh and Turkmen reserves to Western markets 
without passing through Russia—remains unresolved.
Two other access routes for Central Asian resources are 
possible—to the south and to the east. The southern route 
leads through Iran and has not been developed owing to 
differences over the Iranian nuclear program and related 
issues. The eastern route runs generally toward China, 
with a southeastern option from Turkmenistan toward 
India. Given the explosive recent economic expansions 
in China and India, these eastern and southeastern routes 
hold special promise. Given political-economic compli-
cations surrounding the BTC pipeline and trans-Caspian 
access, these eastern options provide some of the most 
potent alternatives to abject reliance on Moscow that are 
available for Central Asia.
Central Asia’s Special Place in Korean 
Thinking
Apart from oil and natural gas, Central Asia also has sub-
stantial uranium reserves—more than 17 percent of the 
global total.13 In a world of prospectively high, albeit vol-
atile global energy prices and a revival of nuclear power 
as a long-term energy supply option, these uranium re-
serves are also of growing importance. The relative ease 
of transporting refi ned uranium products, even by air, 
adds to their attraction, especially for distant countries 
like Korea and the United States.
Korea’s energy insecurities are well known.14 Its econo-
my, with powerful steel, shipbuilding, and petrochemical 
sectors as well as a mobile, automobile-oriented society, 
is unusually energy intensive. Yet Korea has no domestic 
oil or gas to speak of.15 And for the energy that it must 
inevitably import in large amounts, Korea is heavily de-
pendent on the volatile Middle East.
Central Asia represents, over the long term, one complex 
but potentially important means of reducing Korea’s un-
attractively high Middle East energy dependence. Apart 
from its expanding oil and gas production capacity—
unusual in global perspective—Central Asia can literally 
fuel Korea’s diversifi cation away from hydrocarbons by 
supplying uranium for Korea’s numerous nuclear-power 
plants. As indicated in Table 2, there are already 20 such 
plants in operation, and 6 others are planned. Korea is 
currently nearly 40 percent reliant on nuclear power for 
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its electricity, one of the highest ratios in the world, and 
its uranium demand will inevitably continue to rise in 
coming years.
Table 2: Korea’s Nuclear Power Generation Capactiy, 
2006
Source: Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power Co., Ltd.
Central Asia will be well equipped to supply Korea’s ris-
ing demand for uranium. Kazakhstan alone, as indicated 
in Figure 8, is expected by the World Nuclear Associa-
tion to triple its 2007 production levels by 2010, and to 
nearly double them once again, from those substantially 
higher levels, by 2018. Korea has already recently con-
cluded major long-term contracts with both Kazakhstan 
and Uzbekistan, which will assure deepening relation-
ships with both of these key Central Asian producers for 
many years to come.16
Central Asia has other resources that are also of inter-
est to Korea. Apart from oil, gas, and uranium, there are 
substantial stores of gold and other nonferrous metals as 
well as coal. About 1.5 percent of the world’s resource 
for antimony and mercury lies in the Kyrgyz Repub-
lic, southeastern Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan. In addi-
tion, large amounts of lead, silver, and zinc are found 
in Achisay and in the Altai Mountains of Kazakhstan. 
Gold is found in the Kyrgyz Republic, southeastern Uz-
bekistan, and Tajikistan. In addition to gold, copper re-
serves abound in Kounrad in Uzbekistan and Jezkagan 
in Kazakhstan. These two places, as well as Akchatau in 
Kazakhstan, have large deposits of molybdenum. Other 
minerals found in the region include asbestos in the Altai 
Mountains, chromium in the Khromtau, and phosphate 
in Karatau (both in Kazakhstan). Coal is found on the 
Kazakh plateau, in the Muyunkum desert, east of Issyk 
Kul, and in the Naryn basin east of the Ferghana Valley 
in Uzbekistan. The Hissar Mountains, the nearby town of 
Nebit Dag (Turkmenistan), and the Surkhandarya region 
of Uzbekistan also have considerable coal reserves.17
Figure 8: Kazakhstain’s Uranium Production, 2002–
2018 (est.)
Source: World Nuclear Association, www.world-nuclear.org/. 
Note: In 2007, estimates of uranium production in Australia, 
Canada, and the United States were 8,611, 9,476, and 1,654 tons, 
respectively, compared with 6,637 tons of uranium produced in 
Kazakhstan.
Central Asia is geographically far from Korea, so di-
rect Korean access to that region’s substantial natural 
resources is diffi cult. Unlike uranium, most of such re-
sources cannot economically be transported by air. If and 
when the eastern and southern access routes from Central 
Asia are fully developed, some hydrocarbons could indi-
rectly fl ow to Korea through China or Iran, under swap 
arrangements, which could be effi ciently handled by 
general trading companies. Because energy markets are 
fungible, increments to global supply from Central Asia 
would certainly aid a vulnerable, energy-short nation like 
Korea in the long run.
The most substantial benefi ts to Korea in economic rela-
tions with Central Asia, however, could ultimately lie in 
helping generate third-country trade fl ows, many of them 
mediated by general trading companies that are only in-
directly linked to Korea itself. Given the proximity to 
Central Asia of massive and explosively growing China 
and India—sandwiched between which Central Asia 
fi nds itself—those markets could be especially attractive. 
Such third-country trading activities could be commer-
cially attractive—even lucrative—because of not only 
the proximity of China and India but also the distinctive 
structure of Korean industrial groups and complemen-
tary traits of the Central Asian political economies. The 
combination produces an unusual synergy—one that is 
augmented by the existence of distinctive and substantial 
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ethnic networks linking Korea and Central Asia, as we 
shall see.
Economic transactions in relatively isolated nonmar-
ket economies like much of Central Asia can be quite 
attractive to Korean industrial groups (chaebol), as not-
ed above. Those groups profi t greatly from generating 
trade fl ows, even when margins are low, since they are 
equipped to handle multiple sides of a given transaction. 
They can export capital equipment—for mining, oil re-
fi ning, or whatever—and they can fi nance the transaction 
through affi liated private banks or Korean government 
institutions. They can also fi nd markets for the produc-
tion—be it raw materials or semifi nished products—that 
is generated by the initial transaction. The chaebol can 
similarly supply and fi nance infrastructure—be it pipe-
lines, railways, or airports—to help move the potential 
trade fl ows to market. And chaebol can also provide the 
intellectual services—technology, market research, ad-
vertising, public relations—to support the transactions 
being undertaken.
The comprehensive, one-stop service that Korean groups 
can provide—paralleled only in Japan, among the ma-
jor industrial powers—is particularly valuable in Central 
Asia due to the character of local political economies. 
These countries are rich in natural resources, many of 
them virtually unexploited, yet relatively underdeveloped 
and lacking in support infrastructure and services. The 
middle-range technology and high-quality, cost-effective 
consumer products that Korean fi rms can provide are also 
highly suited to Central Asian needs, as is also true in 
neighboring Russia, China, and eastern Europe. Central 
Asians also tend to have relatively limited information 
and expertise in global marketing despite the massive 
emerging opportunities on their doorstep in China and 
India, which enhances still further the attractiveness for 
them of dealing with the chaebol.
Catalysts for Deeper Ties
The basis is being laid for deeper relations between Korea 
and Central Asia—indeed, for a key Central Asian role 
in Korea’s broader Eurasia strategy—with a substantial 
recent deepening of the transportation network between 
Seoul-Incheon and the region. The Hanjin Group, par-
ent of Korean Airlines, is taking the lead in this effort. 
In late August 2008, the chairman of Hanjin, Cho Yang-
ho, signed a major deal with Uzbek offi cials for joint de-
velopment of Navoi Airport near Tashkent, Uzbekistan. 
This arrangement will involve construction of cargo 
terminals, expansion of fueling facilities, and construc-
tion of a major new logistics center.18 Korean Airlines in 
August 2008 also began air cargo and passenger service 
between Incheon and Tashkent, connecting onward also 
to Europe.
In February 2008, the president of Uzbekistan, Islam Ka-
rimov, visited the Republic of Korea and participated in 
the ceremony of inauguration of the newly elected presi-
dent, Lee Myung-bak. Participation of the president of 
Uzbekistan in the inauguration ceremony was evidence 
of the deepening relationship between the two coun-
tries.19
During his visit to the Republic of Korea, the president 
of Uzbekistan held negotiations with the president of the 
Korea Gas Corporation (KOGAS), Su Ho Lee. Back in 
March 2006, KOGAS and Uzbekneftegaz (Uzbek Oil 
and Gas national holding company) signed a memoran-
dum of understanding envisaging exploratory work, de-
velopment of gas fi elds, and creation of a joint venture to 
explore the Surgil natural-gas deposit at the Ustyurt pla-
teau in northwestern Uzbekistan. The total potential cost 
of the project is estimated at $1.84 billion. Apart from 
KOGAS, South Korean companies like Lotte, LG Inter-
national, SK Gaz, and STX Energy were also involved in 
the project.20
At the 2008 talks, Korean and Uzbek representatives dis-
cussed cooperation between Uzbekneftegaz and KOGAS, 
as well as implementation of joint projects. Agreements 
to establish the new joint venture UzKorGasChemical 
were signed. Daewoo International, which is currently 
actively moving into the global oil and gas industry, and 
Uzbekneftegaz signed an agreement on exploration and 
development in two investment blocks (Kuskuduk and 
Ashibulok) on the Ustyurt plateau. Uzbekyengilsanoat 
(Uzbek Light Industry) and Daewoo International also 
signed a major trade agreement.21
President Lee Myung-bak confi rmed his country’s in-
terest in implementing new projects with Uzbekistan in 
such fi elds as education, automobiles, textiles, informa-
tion technology, infrastructure, and construction as well 
as oil and gas. The trade turnover between the two states 
reached $850 million in 2007. In 2008, the fi gure is ex-
pected to increase further to $1 billion. Kazakhstan and 
the Republic of Korea also actively worked on increasing 
mutual trade during discussions between prime ministers 
of the two countries in May 2008.22
The Korean government is one important catalyst be-
tween Korea and Central Asia. In the framework of 
“energy Silk Road diplomacy” established by President 
Lee Myung-bak and, in particular, during the course of 
Prime Minister Han Seung-soo’s visit to Central Asia in 
May 2008, Korea signed a contract to purchase from Uz-
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bekistan between 2010 and 2016 2,600 tons of uranium 
worth $400 million, an amount representing 9 percent of 
Korea’s projected annual uranium consumption. Korea 
subsequently concluded an even larger agreement with 
Kazakhstan and also agreed to provide $120 million in 
economic aid to Uzbekistan in the coming years as well 
as additional aid for improvement of medical facilities 
and residential areas there.23
In connection with Prime Minister Han’s Central Asian 
tour, a South Korean consortium headed by the Korea 
National Oil Corporation concluded a deal worth $85 
million to obtain a 27 percent stake in Kazakhstan’s 
Zhambyl Oil block, located offshore in the Caspian Sea. 
Exploration of that block will be conducted jointly by the 
Korean consortium and the Kazakhstan national energy 
company, KazMunaiGaz.24 Clearly South Korea intends 
to become a serious player in global energy competition 
and has chosen Central Asia as a major theater in that 
struggle.
A second important catalyst for deeper ties between Ko-
rea and Central Asia is the substantial ethnic-Korean 
community of the region. The so-called Koryo Saram
(literally, Korean people) of the former Soviet republics 
number half a million people and constitute the fourth-
largest Korean diaspora in the world after the United 
States, Japan, and China.25 Most of them are descended 
from exiles deported from the Soviet Far East to Central 
Asia during the Stalinist terrors of the late 1930s.
The Koreans were the fi rst inhabitants of the Soviet 
Union to be deported. Top secret order number 1428-
326cc of the Soviet government and the Communist Par-
ty, “On the Deportation of the Korean Population of the 
Far East,” dated 21 August 1937 and signed by Molotov 
and Stalin was a logical continuation of earlier czarist 
and Soviet policies relating to national minority popula-
tions.26 The uprooted Koreans, who went through many 
hardships, ultimately settled in Kazakhstan and Uzbeki-
stan and contributed substantially to the development of 
agriculture in their new homes.27
Around 70 percent of the Korean ethnic population of the 
former Soviet Union is still found in Central Asia, with a 
strong concentration of Koreans in the southern provinc-
es of Kazakhstan and the Tashkent Province, including 
the city of Tashkent in Uzbekistan. The last Soviet cen-
sus from 1989 counted 191,589 Koreans in Uzbekistan 
(including the autonomous republic of Karakalpakstan), 
and 103,216 in Kazakhstan.28 In 1999, according to Ger-
man Kim, the number of Korean inhabitants in Uzbeki-
stan and Kazakhstan was 209,500 and 99,662, respec-
tively.29 As a consequence of the Tajik civil war, many of 
the Koreans living there—by the time of independence 
some 15,000 people—left the country and settled in 
neighboring republics, primarily Uzbekistan.
South Korean cultural activities have been expanding 
in the region since the collapse of the Soviet Union and 
have added a new dimension to the Korean presence in 
Central Asia. Soon after the Soviet demise, the indepen-
dent Central Asian countries established diplomatic rela-
tions with both Korean states.
At fi rst, North Korea tried to compete with the South in 
establishing and developing ties with Central Asian and 
Russian Koreans. During the early 1990s several hun-
dred Central Asian Koreans visited North Korea. The 
deepening economic crisis in North Korea during the 
mid-1990s, however, resulted in the diminution of con-
tacts30 and sharply reduced North Korean infl uence over 
the Korean diaspora.31
Relations with South Korea developed quickly and 
broadly from the very beginning of Central Asia’s inde-
pendent life. The image of the Republic of Korea as an 
economically developed country has contributed sub-
stantially to the high status of the Korean diaspora in 
Central Asia. Today, the visitors from the former Soviet 
Union to South Korea and vice versa number in the many 
thousands. Large South Korean companies such as LG, 
Samsung, and Daewoo have invested hundreds of mil-
lions of dollars in the economies of Kazakhstan and Uz-
bekistan. Dozens of Korean companies (as well as joint 
ventures involving Korean companies) operate in the 
former Soviet Union, hiring many local Koreans for their 
staffs. Teachers from South Korea teach in Central Asian 
and Russian universities. The Republic of Korea opened 
an educational center in Almaty and, later, Tashkent and 
Bishkek, providing Korean language courses for thou-
sands of people. These centers also promote traditional 
Korean art, disseminate facts about Korean history and 
culture, and hold a variety of cultural events.32
Kazakhstan is on its way to becoming South Korea’s most 
important trading partner in Central Asia. Korean busi-
nesses have invested more than $2 billion in Kazakhstan, 
and South Korean investors have assets in more than 300 
companies there.33 Kookmin Bank, one of South Korea’s 
largest fi nancial institutions, recently purchased a 30 per-
cent stake in Kazakhstan’s CenterCredit Bank for about 
$634 million.34
Since the early 1990s Korean Christian churches have 
operated in Central Asian countries, particularly in Ka-
zakhstan and Uzbekistan.35 The bulk of their parishioners 
are Koreans, but the doors are open to all. Many people 
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go to church not for the sake of religion itself but to be 
able to learn the Korean language and to communicate 
with their fellow Koreans in an informal manner. If origi-
nally it was mostly people of the older generation who 
went to church, now younger people are also signifi cant-
ly interested.36
In Central Asian countries with Korean populations, re-
cently there have been many concerts, exhibitions, the-
ater performances, fashion shows, and other cultural 
events organized by South Korean nongovernmental or-
ganizations together with the Associations of Koreans in 
Kazakhstan and the Association of Korean Cultural Cen-
ters in Uzbekistan. These cultural associations organize 
and hold a variety of sociopolitical, cultural, and sport 
events, which are popular with both elites and the gen-
eral public. ROK embassies play important parts in this 
kind of activity, and the embassies have consistently sup-
ported them.37
Future Prospects
The United States and Korea, together with the European 
Union and Japan, have an enduring stake in the autono-
my and stable political evolution of Central Asia. Neither 
local Islamic terrorism, nor violence between Russia and 
its Near Abroad, nor the remaking of the Soviet Union 
is in the national interest of any of these advanced in-
dustrial countries, which value stable economic ties with 
this energy-rich region. While national and corporate 
commercial rivalries naturally abound, the democratic 
industrialized nations of the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development do share this common in-
terest in a constructive, independent future for Kazakh-
stan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and their neighbors.
These stakes seem fated to deepen in coming years. What-
ever volatility they may exhibit in the short run, global 
energy prices seem highly likely to rise in the long run, 
given fi nite supplies and the strong prospect that per cap-
ita consumption in poor yet populous nations like China 
and India will rise, making nearby Central Asia attractive 
as a supplier. As noted earlier, Kazakhstan, in particular, 
looms large as an increasingly important oil and uranium 
supplier, while Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan also loom 
large in natural gas.
The political-military importance of Central Asia as a 
partner in the struggle against terrorism also seems likely 
to rise. After initial quick successes in the fall of 2001, 
right after the October 2001 American intervention in 
Afghanistan, the antiterrorist struggle there languished, 
particularly after the heavy U.S. redeployment to Iraq. 
Most knowledgeable recent analyses suggest that NATO 
forces there are seriously undermanned and that a major 
buildup is both necessary and likely to occur.38
Central Asia will almost certainly be an important stag-
ing area for any allied buildup in Afghanistan—likely 
led by the United States—that may occur. The United 
Sates has had a major airbase at Manas, in Kyrgyzstan, 
since the fall of 2001, and had another airbase at Khana-
bad Karshi, near Termez, just north of the Afghan border 
from 2001 to 2006.39 Given quietly improving relations 
between the United States and Uzbekistan, as well as the 
logistical requirements of the deepening Afghan confl ict, 
expanded security ties between NATO and several of the 
Central Asian states cannot be excluded.
A third factor deepening the attractiveness of both U.S. 
and Korean cooperation with Central Asia is geopoliti-
cal. Russia appears increasingly intent on reasserting in-
fl uence in its Near Abroad, as evidenced by recent devel-
opments in Georgia and Ukraine. Given that Central Asia 
lies on its current frontiers and is part of the Near Abroad, 
it is particularly sensitive about a unilateral American 
presence. Korean involvement helps to sustain Central 
Asian autonomy while minimizing backlash from a Rus-
sia notably sensitive to developments along its frontiers.
The U.S.-Korea partnership is, of course, fi rmly anchored 
in the bilateral mutual-security relationship, bolstered by 
bilateral economic interdependence. Yet, as this paper 
suggests, there is also a logic of broader global partner-
ship in strategic parts of the world, beyond the North 
Pacifi c itself. Central Asia is among the most promising 
such areas. As in the Middle East, the partnership could 
potentially have a political-military dimension. Korea 
has, after all, been one of the most stalwart allies of the 
United States in Iraq as in so many past confl icts, and 
it could conceivably be supportive in South and Central 
Asia as well.
Even apart from the explicitly military dimension, Kore-
an political-economic involvement in Central Asia—so 
natural, given cultural ties, Korea’s energy requirements, 
and the converse Central Asian need for Korean indus-
trial goods—serves broader American national-security 
goals, even without explicit U.S.-Korean coordination. 
Korean involvement reinforces Central Asian autonomy 
and promotes broader stability, prosperity, and ultimate-
ly democracy. All these things must certainly be in the 
interest of the U.S.-Korean alliance, in its broadest and 
most enlightened form.
–10–
In Conclusion
As globalization proceeds, the interests of major nations 
themselves grow more global. The United States, of 
course, has been a global power—indeed, a preeminent 
global power—since the Second World War and a ma-
jor force in world affairs for more than a century. Korea 
during the past four decades has also developed broad 
concerns—of which energy supplies and foreign mar-
kets are among the most important—that increasingly 
transcend the East Asian region that it calls home. And 
Central Asia, too—across the two short decades of its in-
dependence—has also come to appreciate the economic, 
strategic, and cultural value that ties with distant powers 
like Korea and the United States can have in enhancing 
national autonomy and prosperity.
The U.S.-Korea-Central Asia triangular relationship is 
distinctive for having dual economic and security dimen-
sions. It thus has potential utility in both good times and 
bad. When prosperity drives spiraling demand for energy 
and other commodity prices also rise sharply, importance 
clearly increases for the major players. In economic 
downturns, declining energy and other commodity prices 
put severe pressure on stability in developing countries, 
making Central Asia—a high-cost energy supplier fac-
ing severe infrastructural uncertainties—among the most 
vulnerable regions of all.
Storm clouds, no doubt, are gathering for the global po-
litical economy amid the deepening worldwide fi nancial 
crisis. In the short run, this may bode ill for all three 
principals in the strategic triangle that we have exam-
ined here. Driven by Central and South Asian domestic 
turbulence, the crisis and related social disruption may 
well summon their collaborative impulses in security af-
fairs. Further forward, however, the global economy will 
no doubt recover, and the nations of the triangle with it. 
When that day comes, relations within the U.S.-Korea-
Central Asia triangle will be even deeper and more con-
sequential, in this turbulent world, than ever before.
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